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quent danger." The reasoning seems to be based on tMe fear of establishing
an unjustified means for evasion of liability.12
Several courts have allowed recovery on the theory that the beneficiary
derives his rights through contract father than from the estate of the insured.
13
Courts also say that when the insured purchases his policy, the beneficiary ob-
tains a vested interest which should not later be divested or jeopardized by any
wrongful act of the insured, not excluded from the policy, for which the bene-
ficiary was not responsible, 14 unless it is positively shown that the policy was
obtained in contemplation of the crime. 15
It seems that the contractual right of the beneficiary presents the best argu-
ment in favor of recovery. The insured usually does not purchase the policy
ior his own benefit, but rather for that of a third party; and since ample con-
sideration is paid for the indemnity, the third party should not be deprived of
his rights under the contract merely because one of the original parties has
died or been injured as the result of an unlawful act. The court in the instant
case apparently avoided the necessity of adopting one of the theories set out
above by reasoning that the accident occured before the actual commission of
the felony.
JOHN M. RILEY.
NUISANCE - INJUNCTION - ENJOINING OPERATION OF USED CAR LOT.-Plain-
tiffs, home owners in a zoned residential district were granted a perpetual in-
junction prohibiting the defendants operation of a "used car lot" which was
located on an adjacent unincorporated area and separated from the zoned dis-
trict by a federal highway. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's business
diminished the value of their property, created excessive noise and illumination,
and was unsightly. In affirming the decree of the lower court the Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that
the used car lot constituted a nuisance in fact. Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d
835 (W. Va. 1956).
A person may use his property as he sees fit so long as he does not -invade
the rights of others, based upon the ordinary standards of life and the concep-
tions of reasonable men.' When the use of property is unreasonable, unlawful,
or when it unwarrantably impairs the rights of another it becomes a nuisance, 2
depending upon the particular facts of each case. A common conception of a
nuisance is that it is anything which results in the disturbance or annoyance
of one in lawful use, possession, or enjoyment of his property or which renders
its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable. 3 Nuisances have been
11. Domieo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N.W. 538 (1934);
Hcme State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
12. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Flukinger, 33 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1929);
Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239, 243 (1943) (dictum).
13. Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492 53 P.2d 562 (1936); Collins
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 111. 37, 83 N.E. 542, 544 (1907) (dictum).
14. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Guller, 68 Ind. App. 544, 119 N.E. 173 (1918); Payne
v. Louisiana Industrial -Life Ins. Co., 33 So.2d 444 (La. 1948).
15. Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
1. Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498, 4 S.E.2d 155 (1939).
2. Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 341 Pa. 379, 19 A.2d 362 (1941); accord, City
cf Temple v. Mitchell, 180 S.W.2d 959, 962 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (the invasion must be
substantial).
3. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
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classified as nuisance per se,4 in fact, 5 and are also classified as being public
or private.
7
No one has a legal right to absolute quiet, but can only insist upon quietness
to a degree which is consistent with the prevailing standard of the surround-
ing locality.8 It is to be noted that recurring noise may constitute a nuisance
at night, but not during the day.9 Thus courts have enjoined the manufacture
cf culverts,10 the loading of milk wagons and the running of an ice crusher
during the customary sleeping hours." 1 A court will not abate a nuisance on the
ground of noise alone unless it causes a material and physical discomfort to a
person of ordinary sensibilities.'12 This same reasoning is applicable to objec-
tions regarding excessive illumination,' 3 but mere aesthetic considerations
alone will not ordinarly give rise to an actionable nuisance. 1 4 The lawful use
of one's property which causes adjoining property to depreciate in value is not
ordinarily grounds for an injunction.'3
Generally courts of equity are reluctant to bar the operation of a lawful
business and will look for a remedy other than an injunction. 16 However,
such lawful businesses as a garage17 and an ice plant located in a residential
district were held to constitute a nuisance under certain conditions which are
enjoinable.18
It seems apparent that the granting of a perpetual injunction in the instant
c.;se is not in harmony with previous West Virginia decisions which have held
4. Simpson v. DuPont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S.E. 344 (1915) ("nuisance
per se is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances regardless of locality or surroundings".); cf. Beckwith v. Town of Stratford,
129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775, 776 (1943) (Contributory negligence is no defense).
5. New Orleans v. Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910) ("Nuisances in fact
are those which become nuisances by reason of circumstances".); High Penn Oil Co., 238
N. C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1953), (dictum), ("... a nuisance by reason of locality
or by reason of the way they are constructed, maintained, or operated".).
6. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921) ("A public nuisance is one
which damages all persons who come within the sphere of its operation though it may vary
iu its effect on individuals".); Commonwealth v. South Covington and D. St. By., 181
Ky. 459, 205 S.W. 581 (1918).
7. Black, Law Dictionary 1215 (4th ed. 1951) (A private nuisance is any wrongful
act which destroys or deteriorates the property of a few persons or an individual or inter-
feres with their lawful use or enjoyment thereof). But see Young v. Brown, 212 S. C. 156,
46 S.E.2d 673, 679 (1948) (There is a class of nuisances which may properly be de-
nominated mixed nuisances in that while they injure the public at large they cause special
i.jury to private individuals).
8. Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (1910); accord, Nannum
v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 A.2d 99 (1943).
9. 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 572 (1934).
10. Wheat Culvert Co. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932).
11. Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 200 N.W. 350 (1924)
Decree modified in other respects.).
12. Schneider v. Fromm Laboratories, 262 Wis. 21, 53 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1952)
(dictum).
13. See Amphitheatres Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948);
See also Village of Wadena v. Folkestad, 194 Minn. 146, 260 N.W. 221 (1935) (con-
cerning both light and noise.)
14. Alabama Power Co. v. Stringfellow, 228 Ala. 422, 153 So. 629 (1934) (claim
of unsightliness is demurrable.); Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592
(]951) (dictum).
15. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 1930) (dictum);
Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726, 732 (1950) (dictum). But see
Conway v. Gampel, 235 Mich. 511, 209 N.W. 562 (1926) (Evidence of the depreciation
of the value of the property may be considered with respect to the fact of nuisance al-
though there may be an adequate relief at law).
16. Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549, 555 (1948) (dictum) (Court
should regulate future operations to eliminate claimed objections).
17. Ballstadt v. Pagel, 202 Wis. 484, 232 N.W. 862 (1930).
18. Brickley v. Morgan Util. Co., 173 Ark. 1038, 294 S.W. 38 (1927).
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that a lawful business does not constitute a nuisance per se. 19 A business not
a nuisance per'se should not be perpetually enjoined from operating, but only
fiorn operating as a nuisance in fact. If the facts can be altered the business-
man should be allowed to change and remove those elements which would
make it a nuisance in fact under an interlocutory decree.
RONALD SPLITT.
REAL PROPERTY - JOINT TENANCY - CONTRACT FOR SALE BY ALL JOINT
TENANTS SEVERS JOINT TENANCY.- Husband and wife contracted to sell
land which they held in joint tenancy without specifying how the proceeds
were to be held. While the agreement was still executory the husband died
intestate, whereupon his estate claimed one-half the proceeds due on the con-
tract. In an action in equity seeking a declaration of rights as to the proceeds
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that a
contract for deed executed by both joint tenants who had not specified how
the proceeds were to be held, effected a severance of the joint tenancy. Th.
doctrine of equitable conversion applied to convert the estate into personalty
which was held by the husband and wife as tenants in common with no right
of survivorship. In Re Baker's Estate, 78 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1956).
In Iowa as in the majority of jurisdictions, joint tenancies are disfavored.,
Hence a conveyance to two or more parties, in the absence of expressed intent
to create a joint tenancy, results in the creation of a tenancy in common.2 The
existence of the joint tenancy depends on the presence of the four unities of
time, title, interest, and possession.:, If any of the unities are destroyed, during
the lifetime of the joint tenants the estate is severed, thus extinguishing the
right of survivorship. 4
The court in the instant case reasoned that a conveyance by one joint tenant
to a third party effects a severance of the joint tenancy. They then concluded
that as a necessary corollary the joint tenancy is severed where both joint
tenants enter into a contract to sell all their interest, even though they retain
legal title, 5- although it has been held in another jurisdiction that the execu-
tion of a contract for the sale of land by all joint tenants, does not of itself
cffect a severence.G
It is arguable that if equitable conversion is applicable to the situation in the
itistant case it does not effect a severance of the joint tenancy, since it does not
19. State ex rel. Ammerman v. City of Philippi, 136 W. Va. 120, 65 S.E.2d 713
(1951) (tire recapping); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608,
191 S.E. 368, (1937) (auto wrecking establishment); Chambers v. Cramer, 49 W. Va.
395, 38 S.E. 691 (1901) (blacksmith shop); The Central National Bank v. City of Buck-
hannon, 118 W. Va. 26, 188 S.E. 661, 662 (1936) (dictum) (service station).
1. Switzer v. Pratt, 257 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946); Shipley v. Shipley, 324
Ill. 560, 155 N.E. 334 (1927); De Forge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 7.33, 736
(1956) (dictum).
2. Iowa Code § 557.15 (1950); N. D. Rev. Code § 47-0206 (1943).
3. Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1950) (dictum). But see
Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259 (1936) (Wherein Iowa apparently re-
pudiates the "unity'test" in favor of an "intent of the parties test.").
4. Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1950) (dictum).
5. See In re Sprague's Estate, 44 Iowa 540, 57 N.W.2d 212 (1953) (Which .s
apparently distinguishable from the instant case in that there was a will involved and it
v'as stipulated that the proceeds were held as tenants in common-here there was no will
nor any other provision for the proceeds.).
6. Chartier v. Simon, 250 Wis. 642, 27 N.W. 752 (1947). Contra, Buford v. Dahlke,
158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954). '
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